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 概要 
 
大学の社会への直接的な貢献が要請される中で、政府は 1990 年代以降、日本版バイ・ドール
法の施行を始めとした幾つかの抜本的な改革に着手した。これを受けて各大学においても、研究成果
の商業化や産学連携を志向した様々な施策が講じられた。これらの取り組みは、大学教員による特許
出願や大学発ベンチャーの設立などの点において一定の成果を上げたものの、商業化志向が旧来の
科学者コミュニティの価値観を損ない、科学の発展を阻害しているとの批判も少なくない。このような副
作用的側面は、主に米国大学を対象とした実証研究によって示唆されてきたが、日本における実証研
究は（特に個人レベルのデータにおいて）比較的限定されている。そこで本稿では、近年の大学を取り
巻く環境変化が日本の大学研究に及ぼした影響を組織レベルと研究者個人レベルの両面から分析し、
今後の政策検討の一助とすることを目的とした。 
本研究では、国内大学を対象とした「産学連携等実施状況調査」データ（文部科学省により毎
年実施）と、生命科学・材料科学分野の研究者個人 700 名に関するサーベイ・データ（本稿著者の研究
グループにより 2009 年実施）を利用し、以下の結果を得た。 
 
＜組織レベルでの活動に対する大学施策の影響＞ 
• 1990 年代以降、大学レベルでの組織的取り組みは順調に推移し、2007 年頃までに専門組織（TLO
や知的財産本部）の設置、関連ガイドラインの制定などは定常状態に達した（図 1）。 
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図１ 産学連携組織の累積設置率の時系列推移 
（注）上位 100 大学とは、科学技術補助金取得額上位 100 大学（2007 年）を示す。 
 
• これと並行して、大学特許の出願数やライセンス収入なども増加したが、同様に 2007 年頃からそ
の成長は鈍化している（図 2A）。特許出願を分野別に見てみると、生命科学分野では継続的な増
加が観察されたものの、その他の分野（情報、ナノ、環境）では停滞が示唆された。ライセンス収入
については、小規模な収入を中心に件数は増加しているものの、大学レベルでの収入総額が年間
 S-1 
1000 万円を上回るケースは 10～15 大学程度と非常に限定されている（図 2B）。回帰分析の結果、
TLO・知的財産本部の設置は、特許出願や技術移転を有意に促進したことが示唆された。 
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図 2 知的財産権の取得・活用状況 
 
• 科研費取得額上位 45 大学を対象とした生命科学・材料科学分野の研究者個人レベルのデータに
よると、2007-2008 年の 2 年間に、5 割程度の研究者が企業から研究費を得ており、4 割が特許出
願の経験を持ち、また、3 割が何らかの商業的活動に関与していることが示された（図 3A）。これら
のうち、商業的活動から何らかの収入を得た研究者は 12%、また、週当たり 10 時間以上を商業的
活動に費やす研究者は 7%であった（図 3B）。 
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図 3 研究者の産学連携活動 
 
＜研究者個人レベルでの活動に対する大学施策の影響＞ 
• 続いて、これら研究者個人レベルでの活動に対する大学施策の影響を検討した。幾つかの大学で
は、政策転換の初期ステージ（1990 年代中頃）から様々なインフラが整備されてきたのに対して、
2000 年代に入ってから同様のインフラが整備された大学も少なくない。これらを比較すると、早期か
らインフラを有していた大学では、教員の産学連携活動（2007-08 年度の 2 年間）を促進する効果
が比較的弱いことが示された。従って、大学施策の影響が一過的であり、長期的には研究者は本
業の研究活動に回帰している可能性が考えられる。 
 S-2 
 • さらに、産学連携活動が研究活動を阻害する可能性を検討した。自然科学においては、研究者間
で研究材料の共有（マテリアル・トランスファー）が頻繁に行われるが、米国における先行研究によ
れば、産学連携活動に関与する研究者が研究材料の共有を拒むケースが増加していることが指摘
されている。本稿のデータからは、大学研究者の 20%前後が、過去 2 年間にマテリアル・トランスフ
ァーの依頼を拒絶した（或いは拒絶された）経験を持つことが示唆された。また、同じく米国において
産学連携活動が科学論文の遅滞ない出版を阻害するとの報告がなされているが、本稿のサンプル
では、商業的な価値の保全を目的として過去 2 年間に論文の出版を 1 ヵ月以上遅らせたことのあ
る研究者が 11%、論文から特定の情報を除いたことのある研究者が 17%に上ることが示された（図
4）。 
 
• 次に、これらの行動の因果関係を検討するために回帰分析を行ったところ、産学連携活動がマテリ
アル・トランスファーや科学論文の遅滞ない出版を阻害している可能性が示された。 
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図 4 マテリアル・トランスファー・論文出版の停滞 
 
• 加えて、大学レベルでの諸施策についても、初期段階に TLO/知的財産本部が設置された大学で
は、論文出版の阻害が比較的顕著なことが示唆された。一方、大学におけるガイドライン・ポリシー
の制定は、マテリアル・トランスファーの拒絶を抑制しており、科学コミュニティにおける協力関係の
維持に貢献している可能性がある。 
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1. Introduction 
The global trend of academic entrepreneurship has been encouraged scientists to participate in 
commercial activities and university-industry relationships (UIRs) (Etzkowitz, 1983, 1998; Slaughter and 
Leslie, 1997). Japan is no exception, and since the 1990s, the government has implemented various 
mechanisms to promote entrepreneurship (Nagaoka et al., 2009), such as the foundation of special 
organizations (e.g., TLOs, IP management offices) and the establishment of related guidelines and 
regulations. Although this regime shift has occurred relatively recently, it has already resulted in certain 
achievements such as patenting by universities, commercial involvement by faculty members, and 
technology transfer to the industry (Nagaoka et al., 2009). While some academic scientists and policy 
scholars have contended that entrepreneurship really drives innovation and has positive impacts on 
academic activities (NISTEP, 2010), others criticize that entrepreneurship is incompatible with the 
traditional academic values and harms the advancement of science. 
As for the US, where the regime shift occurred almost 20 years before it did in Japan, many 
studies have indicated that the policy redirection has distracted academic science (Dasgupta and David, 
1994; Nelson, 2004). Empirical evidence has shown that entrepreneurial activities discourage academic 
scientists from sharing their knowledge, research tools, and data with other scientists (e.g., Campbell et al., 
2000; Walsh et al., 2007a). Moreover, the literature has indicated that the current academic system with the 
Bayh-Dole Act as a core mechanism is a suboptimal solution for transferring the academic knowledge into 
industry (Kenney and Patton, 2009); i.e., the new regime does not effectively function as a driver of 
innovation. Kenney and Patton (2009) further contend that Japan and European countries have copied the 
US system without careful examination even if the original system in each country had been relatively 
efficient. 
Although there are many contextual differences between Japan and the US, these negative 
implications in the US should not be overlooked since Japanese academia might experience the same 
problem in the near future. Nevertheless, because there is a growing demand for academia to directly 
contribute to the society, we have to implement somewhat hybrid system to sustain both traditional 
academic science and practical contribution to the society. Amid this controversy, several studies have 
been conducted regarding Japanese academia (e.g., NISTEP, 2008; Kanama and Okuwada, 2007). 
However, most of the previous studies are based on organization-level observations, and we have limited 
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empirical data regarding individual-level phenomena. Hence, this study aims to examine the behavioral 
change of university scientists in the last decade, specifically in terms of entrepreneurial activities and their 
influence on academic activities. In so doing, this study intends to offer statistical information for the 
further development of the Japanese academic system. 
To this end, the current paper draws on the following two data sources. The first is a survey 
conducted annually by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology 
(MEXT), from which we obtain the university-level data regarding infrastructure and systems for 
entrepreneurship. The other is a survey conducted by the research group of this paper’s author in 2009. 
From this data source, we obtain the data on entrepreneurial activities and other academic activities at the 
individual level. The details of the data are shown in Chapter 2. Subsequently, using the MEXT survey 
data, Chapter 3 describes university interventions for entrepreneurship and analyzes their effects on 
university-level entrepreneurial output. Drawing on our survey data coupled with the MEXT data, Chapter 
4 illustrates individual-level entrepreneurial activities and other academic activities, and then analyzes the 
effects of entrepreneurship on those activities. Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the implications of this study. 
Figure 1 shows the structure of this paper. 
 
Figure 1 Structure of the paper 
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2. Data 
2.1. Dataset 1 
MEXT has annually conducted a survey of Japanese universities on UIRs since 2004 (H15). The 
survey covers diverse information such as patenting, technology transfer, co-research with industry, and 
measures to facilitate UIRs. The details of the survey and the summary of the results can be found on the 
MEXT website.1 This study draws on the data for 2004 (H15) – 2007 (H18). The survey in 2007 covered 
approximately 1,300 universities including national, public, private, and four-year and two-year 
universities. Among these, this study uses 750 four-year universities (87 national, 86 public, and 577 
private). Since we were concerned about research-active scientists or universities, most analyses focus on 
the 100 universities that obtained the largest amount of Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research in 2007. 
 
2.2. Dataset 2 
In 2009, the author’s research group conducted a survey, which covered the top 45 Japanese 
universities with regard to the amount of Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research in 2007 (the list of 
universities is shown in Appendix 1). This survey targeted the fields of life science (e.g., basic biology, 
basic medicine, clinical science, agricultural science, pharmaceutical science) and material science. 2 We 
prepared a sampling frame including 8,013 full or associate professors who obtained research funds from 
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research in the last five years. We mailed our survey to randomly sampled 
1,674 scientists and received 698 responses (42% response rate3). The description of the sample is as 
follows: 83% are life scientists while 17% are material scientists. On average, they obtained their degree in 
1988, had worked in 2.8 laboratories in their career, and have been working in their current laboratory for 
13 years. The mean number of publications is 5.8 per year. 
 
  
                                                                
1 http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/shinkou/sangaku/sangakub.htm 
2 The scientific field of scientists was determined using the database of Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research. The database 
records in what scientific field each scientist has obtained research funds (what is called KAKEN code). For each scientist, 
we chose a single field that was most frequently assigned. 
3 We tested for non-response bias as follows. We obtained publication data from the Web of Science for 100 scientists in 
each of the response and non-response groups, and checked for differences in publication productivity across the two groups. 
We find no significant difference (7.4 vs. 9.1 publications per year, p = 0.22). However, we did find that full professors were 
less responsive than associate professors (38% vs. 46%, p < 0.01). Therefore, our sample represents the population in terms 
of productivity but may have oversampled younger scientists. 
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2.3. Supplementary data 
We also draw on the questionnaire information of 2007 Report on the Survey of Research and 
Development provided by Statistics Bureau Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications under the 
Statistics Act Article 33 . The survey inquired about the number of faculty members and scientists, and the 
size of research budget, and so forth at 674 universities. In our analyses, we use part of the data to control 
for university-level research intensity. 
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3. University-level entrepreneurship 
This chapter describes the university-level interventions for entrepreneurship and their outcomes. 
The analyses draw on dataset 1: the MEXT survey. Since the 1990s, the Japanese government has changed 
its science policy to accelerate national innovation by efficiently utilizing the resources of academia. 
Starting with the enforcement of the Science and Technology Basic Law in 1995, several laws were 
enacted: the Technology Transfer Law in 1998, the Japanese version of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1999, and 
the Basic Law on Intellectual Property in 2002. Further, national universities were incorporated in 2004. In 
response to these changes, each university has implemented its own systems and organizations to facilitate 
entrepreneurship. The MEXT survey inquired about university-level interventions from several angles 
(Ch.3.1). These interventions have led to a significant increase in entrepreneurial output such as patents, 
technology transfer, and so forth. We also analyze how the university interventions contributed to this 
increase in output (Ch.3.2) 
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3.1. University-level interventions for entrepreneurship 
3.1.1. Three stages of infrastructure for entrepreneurship 
Policy, regulation, and guideline. As a primary step, university administrations tend to draw up 
guidelines or regulations and put them somewhere accessible for faculty members. However, they tend not 
to pay much attention to them, so this type of intervention may not be very influential. Figure 2 shows the 
percentages of universities in the whole sample and in the top 100 universities that have implemented each 
policy, regulation, and guideline as of March 2007. The graph indicates that some policies and guidelines 
have generally been implemented (e.g., sponsored research, employee invention, co-research, etc.) while 
others are rather rare (e.g., purchase and holding of stocks, licensing, etc.). 
 
Figure 2 Policy, regulation, and guideline 4 
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4 Source: MEXT survey (H18): Form 8. 
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Management system. The next step is to organize a system to execute the policies and guidelines. 
The system is embedded in existing organizations and assigns administrative personnel the tasks of 
carrying out the policies. Figure 3 shows the percentage of universities that have implemented respective 
types of management system (as of March 2007). 
 
Figure 3 Management system 5 
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5 Source: MEXT survey (H18): Form 8. 
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Foundation of special organization. The most advanced stage is to establish special organizations 
with expert personnel. This includes technology licensing offices (TLOs), IP management offices (IPOs), 
incubators, etc. Figure 4 illustrates when special organizations for entrepreneurship (i.e., IPOs, affiliated 
TLOs, and incubators / venture business laboratories (VBLs)) were founded. Figure 4A indicates that 
TLOs have gradually been founded since 1997 while most IPOs were established in 2003 and 2004. Since 
TLOs and IPOs share their missions to some extent, the graphs also show the transition of the foundation 
of a TLO/IPO (the earlier of the two). As of 2007, 80% of the top 100 universities had either an IPO or an 
affiliated TLO (Figure 4B). Incubators and VBLs have also gradually increased since 1994. In 2007, 57% 
of universities had an incubator or VBL. 
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Figure 4 Special organization for entrepreneurship 6 
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(B) Accumulated percentage 
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6 Source: MEXT survey (H18): Form 9. Only top 100 universities. 
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3.1.2. Other interventions  
Right of inventions. Historically, the rights to invention used to be attributed to the nation in 
national universities, but the Japanese Byah-Dole Act has changed this practice. As of 2007, 33% of 
universities in the whole sample had attributed invention rights to organizations while only 3% gave the 
rights to individuals, and 27% had not established a specific rule for this issue (those who did not give an 
answer might have had no rule) (Figure 5). Of the top 100 universities, more than 90% attributed the 
invention rights to the universities. Particularly, some private universities in the top 100 attributed the 
rights to the universities without exception, while it was very rare in national/public universities. 
 
Figure 5 Invention rights 7 
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7 Source: MEXT survey (H18): Form 3. 
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Intramural training program. The previous literature has indicated that intramural training 
programs significantly affect the entrepreneurial and academic activities of scientists (Blumenthal et al., 
2006). Such a program may include lectures on related legal issues, related administrative processes in 
each university, and so forth. Figure 6 shows that 20% of universities in the whole sample had an IP-
related training program for their faculty. In the top 100 sample, 80% had such programs, so this 
intervention seems to be heavily associated with the level of research intensity. Among the 100 universities, 
smaller percentage of private universities offered a program. 
 
Figure 6 Intramural training program 8 
 
Have you held an intramural seminar or lectures in order to promote the creation of intellectual properties? 
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8 Source: MEXT survey (H18): Form 9. 
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Material transfer agreement. Material transfer is an indispensable route for university scientists 
both to cooperate with one another and to provide their resources to industry (National Academy of 
Sciences, 2003). In order to control the flow of materials and secure the property rights, some academic 
organizations require their faculty members to make a contract when they send their materials to outside 
organizations. To this end, some universities prepare and provide a standardized format of contract for the 
faculty members. Figure 7 shows the percentage of universities that had prepared and published a format 
for a material transfer agreement. It indicates that only 10% of all the universities had prepared a format 
and that fewer than 50% had done so even among the top 100. 
 
Figure 7 Format for material transfer agreement 9 
 
Have you prepared a contract format for material transfer? If so, do you publish it? 
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9 Source: MEXT survey (H18): Form 8. 
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3.2. Accelerated entrepreneurship at the university level (2004-2007) 
This section analyzes how the regime shift has accelerated entrepreneurial activities at the 
university level. From the MEXT survey, we primarily focus on two types of entrepreneurial output: (1) 
inventions and patenting and (2) licensing and technology transfer.10  
 
3.2.1. Description of entrepreneurial activities at the university level 
Patent application. Figure 8 shows the transition of patent applications. Figure 8A shows the total 
number of patents applied for by the top 100 universities.11 It indicates a rapid increase in 2004 - 2006, but 
it seems that the growth reached steady rate in 2006-2007. In accordance with this view, Figure 8B 
compares the average number of applications per researcher in each university in 2006 and 2007, 
indicating that approximately half of the universities were still in an increasing stage (red dots) while the 
rest were in a steady or decreasing stage (blue dots). Further, Figure 8C examines the transition by field. 
The graph shows that patent applications in life science were still increasing in 2007, while those in other 
fields (i.e., nanotech, information science, and environmental science) were merely steady or even 
decreasing.12 
 
Figure 8 Patenting 13 
(A) Number of patents applied for by the top 100 universities 
 
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
2004 2005 2006 2007
                                                                
10 The detailed description is found in NISTEP (2009). 
11 Because the survey of earlier years did not cover as many universities as those of later years, we had to focus on 100 
universities covered throughout the survey. 
12 This interpretation needs caution since the field distinction can be ambiguous. 
13 Source: MEXT survey (H18): Form 5. Sum of domestic patent applications and foreign applications. 
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(B) Comparison between 2006 and 2007 
 
 
(C) By field 14 
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14 Only national universities are counted. 
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Technology transfer and license income. Figure 9 illustrates the changes of technology transfer 
and license income. The transactions include the licensing of patents, designs, trademarks, and other 
intellectual properties. Figure 9A indicates that the number of transferred technologies and the income 
from the transfer had increased from 2004 to 2007. However, Figure 9B shows that the average value of 
transactions has been decreasing significantly, implying that universities were beginning to earn small 
income from technologies that they used to give away for free. 
At the university level, 67 universities out of the top 100 gained in 2007 while only 21 did in 2004 
(Figure 9C). Among these 67, only 14 earned more than 10 million JPY. During the four years, only a few 
universities (the Universities of Tokyo, Tohoku, and Nagoya) have earned more than 100 million JPY per 
year (this is a certain threshold that the licensing activities could be profitable for a university). The 
median of license income for the top 100 universities is one million JPY, indicating that licensing activities 
in Japanese universities have apparently not played a substantial role as an income source. To explain this, 
our interviewees from university administrations contended that their mission was not making a profit but 
is to disseminate academic resources.  
 
Figure 9 Technology transfer and license income 15 
(A) Number of transactions and amount of income 
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15 Source: MEXT survey (H18): Form 5. 
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(B) Average value of technology transfer 
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(C) Number of universities making income 
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3.2.2. Effect of university interventions for entrepreneurship 
In order to examine the effects of the university interventions for entrepreneurship, we built the 
following econometric model. 
EAଶ଴଴଻,୧ ൌ β଴ ൅ βଵEAଶ଴଴ସ,୧ ൅ βଶ∆IEଶ଴଴ସିଶ଴଴଻,୧ ൅ βଷIEିଶ଴଴ସ,୧ ൅ βସControl୧ ൅ µ୧ 
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, where EA stands for entrepreneurial activity shown in the previous section (e.g., patenting) and IE stands 
for interventions for entrepreneurship described in the previous chapter (e.g., foundation of TLOs). In this 
model, we intend to examine the effect of the difference in interventions between 2004 and 2007 
(∆IEଶ଴଴ସିଶ଴଴଻) on the difference in entrepreneurial activity (EAଶ଴଴଻ controlled by EAଶ଴଴ସ). As variables 
for interventions, we used the foundation of organizations for entrepreneurship: (1) a TLO or IPO and (2) 
an incubator, because these are the only variables for which we have time-series information. We coded 
∆IEଶ଴଴ସିଶ଴଴଻ one if each organization was established between 2004 and 2007, and zero otherwise. In 
addition, since the interventions may take time to have any effect, we included the interventions before 
2004. We coded IEିଶ଴଴ସ one if each organization was established before 2004. Further, we controlled for 
the types of universities (national, private, and public) and the input of research activity (the number of 
scientists16 and the amount of the research budgets17). As dependent variables, we drew on the three 
indicators mentioned in the previous section: (1) the number of patent applications, (2) the number of 
technology transfers, and (3) whether a university had a license income. 
Table 1 shows the results of the regressions. Models 1-3 include all of the four-year universities 
while Models 4-6 include only the top 100 universities. Models 1-3 show significant coefficients for most 
of the independent variables, but this may be simply because of a general difference between 
entrepreneurially-active universities and non-active universities. In order to examine the effects more 
precisely, we focused on research-intensive universities (i.e., the top 100 universities) in Models 4-6. 
Model 4 indicates that the foundation of TLOs or IPOs significantly increased the number of patents (b = 
1.21, p < 0.01). Model 5 does not show a significant effect of the difference in interventions. Model 6 
indicates a weakly significant effect (b = 2.53, p < 0.1). In addition, Models 4-6 show that TLOs/IPOs 
founded before 2004 strongly increased entrepreneurial activities in 2007. These results imply that 
affiliated TLOs or IPOs contribute to the production of entrepreneurial outputs. The effect of having 
incubators is not as clear. 
 
16 Scientists include faculty members, Ph.D. students, and medical doctors. Scientists in the fields of social sciences and 
humanities are not counted for this study because they are rarely involved in entrepreneurial activity. 
17 The total amount of research budgets used inside the organization. 
Table 1  Prediction of entrepreneurial output at the university level a 
Control
#Scientists .00 ** (.00) .00 *** (.00) .00 (.00) .00 *** (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00)
Research budget .00 (.00) .00 † (.00) .00 * (.00) .00 * (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00)
Private school ‐.63 *** (.13) ‐.38 *** (.08) ‐2.19 *** (.59) ‐.07 (.26) ‐.53 * (.25) ‐2.20 * (1.07)
Public school ‐.52 ** (.18) ‐.39 *** (.10) ‐1.98 * (.95) ‐.42 (.35) ‐.70 * (.32) ‐2.50 * (1.06)
EA (2004)
Patent application2004 .55
*** (.05) .45 *** (.08)
Tech. transfer2004 .32
*** (.06) .39 ** (.13)
License income2004 2.10
* (.84) 2.23 (1.36)
IE (‐2004)
TLO/IPO‐2004 .86
*** (.12) .35 *** (.07) 2.96 *** (.60) 1.42 *** (.29) .73 ** (.26) 3.15 ** (1.17)
Incubator‐2004 .76
*** (.17) .54 *** (.09) .82 (.62) .46 † (.27) .37 (.24) .53 (.90)
ΔIE (2004‐2007)                   
TLO/IPO 2004‐2007 .87
*** (.18) .01 (.10) 2.66 *** (.78) 1.21 ** (.36) .23 (.33) 2.53 † (1.48)
Incubator2004‐2007 1.10
*** (.30) .67 *** (.17) 3.64 † (1.97) .58 (.44) .50 (.40) .36 (1.49)
        
F/χ2 test 168.60 *** 146.06 *** 265.16 ***          31.81 *** 23.14 *** 65.13 ***          
Log likelihood ‐446.31 ‐231.41 ‐65.96          ‐116.76 ‐106.96 ‐30.85          
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 .80 .78 .67          .74 .68 .51          
N 381 381 387          97 97 100          
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
All 4‐year university Top100 university
ln(# Patent 
application)
ln(# Technology 
transfer contract)
License income
(Yes/No)
ln(# Patent 
application)
ln(# Technology 
transfer contract)
License income
(Yes/No)
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
                                                                
a Standard errors in parentheses. †: p<0.1, *:p<0.05, **:p<0.01, ***:p<0.001. OLS regressions except for Models 3 and 6 (logit regressions). 
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4. Transition of entrepreneurship and other academic activities at the individual level 
This chapter illustrates the entrepreneurial activities and other academic activities at the individual 
level in 2007-2008 using dataset 2, and analyzes how the university-level interventions affected them. By 
this time, most research-intensive universities had already implemented their strategies to facilitate 
entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, the level of interventions differed by university to some extent, and 
moreover, we expect that there still was flux and deviation at the individual level because it takes time to 
change the culture and customs in the scientific community.  
 
4.1. Transition of entrepreneurial activities at the individual level 
4.1.1. Description of entrepreneurial activities 
Commercial involvement. Figure 10 illustrates the involvement of our respondents in commercial 
activities. The survey inquired about the type of commercial activities respondents were involved in during 
2007-2008. As a whole, one in three scientists was involved in certain forms of commercial activities: 
negotiations with industry as for the commercial use of research results (28%), feasibility study of business 
plan (3%), licensing (7%), establishing a start-up (2%), and developing new technologies for market (6%) 
(Figure 10A). Among these types of commercial activities, the last three types can lead to commercial 
income (which we call late-stage commercial activity), but only 12% of respondents had been involved in 
at least one of those activities. Comparing with previous literature on the US academia, the involvement in 
late-stage commercial activity seems limited. For example, Walsh et al. (2007a) has indicated licensing 
(18%) and establishing start-up (8%). For those who had been involved in at least one type of commercial 
activity, Figure 10B examines the average time spent on the activities, indicating that a fairly limited time 
was spent on commercial activities. On average, the respondents spent 1.8% of their time on commercial 
activities, while Walsh et al. (2007a) indicates 3% in the US data. Only 7% of the respondents answered 
that they spent more than 10 hours per week. In addition, Figure 10C shows the ratio of commercial 
involvement (any type) in several fields, which indicates a difference between basic and applied fields. 
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Figure 10 Involvement in commercial activities 
(A) Type of commercial activities 
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18 Only the respondents who answered that they had been involved in commercial activities in (A) are counted. 
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(C) Field differences (have been involved in at least one type of commercial activity) 
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Patent application. Next, Figure 11 illustrates patenting by scientists. Figure 11A shows the 
frequency distribution, indicating that a majority (60%) of scientists had never applied for patents and that 
most of the rest had done so 1-3 times in two years. The average frequency of patent application was 1.15 
times in two years. Of all the patents, 53% were applied for with industry partners. Figure 11B shows the 
percentages of patentees (who have applied for at least one patent) by field. It indicates that patenting is 
relatively common in some fields such as material science (64%) but not in other field such as basic 
medicine (28%). 
 
Figure 11 Patenting 
(A) Frequency distribution 
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Industry funding. Figure 12 illustrates the funding of research budgets from industry. As a whole, 
51% of the respondents received some amount of industry funds. The amount of industry funds 
significantly varies from scientist to scientist as shown in Figure 12A. Half of them had no industry 
funding, and the rest received part of their budget from industry. For those who received funding from 
industry, on average, industry funds accounted for 22% of their research budget. The ratio significantly 
differs by scientific field from the lowest in basic biology (28%) to the highest in material science (73%) 
(Figure 12B).  
 
Figure 12 Industry funding 
(A) Frequency distribution 
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4.1.2. The effect of university interventions  
We examined whether the above-mentioned individual-level entrepreneurial activities were 
influenced by university-level interventions using regression models. We regress several indicators for 
entrepreneurial activities on three variables of university-level interventions. By 2007, most research-
intensive universities had founded certain forms of organizations for entrepreneurship. Thus, we use the 
number of years since such an organization was founded (#years since foundation).19 A large number for 
this variable may indicate an established culture for entrepreneurship, or it could imply the obsolescence of 
university interventions. In addition, we included a dummy variable coded one when a university had 
founded at least one organization by 2007 and zero otherwise (TLO/IPO/Incubator-2007). Finally, to 
examine the effect of a non-organizational form of intervention, we included a variable for policies and 
guidelines related to entrepreneurship (policy & guideline). 20 We controlled for several variables at the 
individual level: the amount of research funds that respondents obtained at the individual level (¥ funds), 
whether respondents had a permanent contract (permanent contract), whether their affiliation is a private 
school (private school), the number of publications (# publication), and scientific fields. In addition, to 
control the university-level research intensity, we included research budget per scientist.  
For the three types of entrepreneurial activities discussed in the previous section, we prepared 2-4 
dependent variables. Regarding commercial activity, we had (1) any commercial activity, (2) early-stage 
commercial activity (negotiation or feasibility study), (3) late-stage commercial activity (the rest), and (4) 
whether a scientist spent any time on commercial activity. As for patent applications, we used (5) whether 
a scientist had applied for at least one patent in the last two years, (6) the number of patents applied for, (7) 
whether a scientist had applied for a patent with an industry partner, and (8) the number of patents applied 
for with an industry partner. For industry funding, we had (9) whether a scientist obtained any funds from 
industry and (10) the percentage of funds obtained from industry.  
Table 2 shows the result for the regressions. Models 1-4 indicate negative coefficients of #years 
since foundation (Model 1: b = -0.07, p < 0.05; Model 2: b = -0.11, p < 0.05; Model 4: b = -0.10, p < 0.05), 
suggesting that commercial activities are more common in universities that founded organizations for 
                                                                
19 The number of years since a TLO, IPO or incubator was first founded. 
20 We examined which policies and guidelines each university had implemented before 2007 among those regarding (1) 
research licensing, (2) research tools, (3) UIRs, (4) conflict of interest, (5) compensation for invention, (6) employee 
inventions,(7) IP management, (8) co-research, and (9) sponsored research. Then, we calculated this variable with the 
number of implemented policies and guidelines divided by nine. 
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entrepreneurship more recently. The same tendency is observed in the models for patent application 
(Models 5-8) and in those for industry funding (Models 10). One interpretation for these results is that 
university intervention in the early stage of entrepreneurial regime was counterproductive and the negative 
effects had long remained. This agrees with the criticism on university administration at that time that it 
imposed excessive red tape and deterred entrepreneurial activities. Another interpretation is that the effects 
of university interventions last only for a short term. Scientists might have overreacted to the university 
interventions and been involved in entrepreneurial activities at the beginning but tended to return to their 
original states as time passed.  
As for the effects of policies and guidelines, the models indicate two significant effects. Model 8 
shows a significantly positive coefficient on the number of patent with industry partner (b = 1.26, p < 0.1). 
However, the sign is opposite of Model 7 (dependent variable is a dummy of patent with industry partner), 
so this effect is not very clear. Model 10 shows a negative coefficient of policies and guidelines (b = -10.09, 
p < 0.05), implying that university intervention deterred industry from providing research money for 
university scientists. Model 10 also shows a significantly positive coefficient of TLO/IPO/Incubator-2007 (b 
= 16.64, p < 0.01). Coupling with the coefficient of #years since foundation, this indicates that the effect of 
special organizations is generally positive for industry funding but decreases as time goes. 
 
Table 2  Prediction of entrepreneurial activity at the individual level a 
 
 
Control
¥ Funds .30 *** (.07) .24 ** (.08) .40 *** (.09) .24 ** (.08) .40 *** (.07) .24 *** (.05) .37 *** (.08) .27 *** (.08) .30 *** (.07) ‐.10 (.51)
Permanent contract .11 (.21) .04 (.25) .10 (.30) .04 (.26) ‐.06 (.21) ‐.35 * (.16) .05 (.24) ‐.32 (.22) .13 (.20) ‐.39 (1.54)
Private school .18 (.39) .12 (.46) .44 (.57) 1.06 * (.44) .87 * (.38) .85 ** (.31) .62 (.42) 1.04 * (.43) .05 (.38) .24 (2.92)
# Publication .03 ** (.01) .03 ** (.01) .02 * (.01) .01 (.01) .03 ** (.01) .03 *** (.01) .03 ** (.01) .06 *** (.01) .04 ** (.01) .20 ** (.07)
¥ Research budget per scientist ‐29.20 (40.77) ‐9.03 (49.08) ‐47.11 (57.56) ‐26.78 (50.09) ‐4.59 (40.47) ‐35.48 (30.00) 7.35 (46.49) ‐71.63 † (42.14) ‐54.13 (40.08) 419.52 (301.79)
IE (‐2007)
TLO/IPO/Incubator‐2007 .17 (.68) .79 (.80) ‐1.06 (.97) .32 (.80) .86 (.68) ‐.28 (.50) .44 (.74) ‐.52 (.70) .48 (.66) 16.64
** (5.19)
# Years since foundation ‐.07 * (.04) ‐.11 * (.04) .00 (.05) ‐.10 * (.05) ‐.09 * (.04) ‐.05 † (.03) ‐.10 * (.04) ‐.07 † (.04) ‐.03 (.04) ‐.57 * (.27)
Policy & guideline .04 (.64) .07 (.75) .49 (.96) 1.01 (.83) ‐.39 (.62) .59 (.50) ‐.09 (.73) 1.26 † (.70) ‐.53 (.61) ‐10.09 * (4.67)
        
χ2/F test 78.77 *** 57.08 *** 49.29 *** 45.96 ***          134.46 *** 162.77 *** 115.51 *** 135.02 ***          123.04 *** 8.21 ***
Log likelihood ‐377.64 ‐281.77 ‐211.23 ‐260.48          ‐380.99 ‐849.30 ‐304.24 ‐559.12          ‐390.98 ‐2800.00         
Psuedo/Adjusted R2 .09 .09 .10 .08          .15 .09 .16 .11          .13         
N 669 568 645 656          664 664 664 664          653 653         
Model 10Model 5
Commercial activity Industry fundingPatent application
Any commercial 
activity
(Yes/No)
Only early stage
(Yes/No)
Late stage
(Yes/No)
Spent time on 
commercial 
activities
(Yes/No)
Industry funding 
(Yes/No)
Industry funding 
ratio
At least one patent
(Yes/No)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 9Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
# Patent
Patent w/ industry
(Yes/No)
# Patent w/ 
industry
                                                                
a Standard errors in parentheses. †: p<0.1, *:p<0.05, **:p<0.01, ***:p<0.001. Dummy variables for scientific fields are omitted from the table. Logit regressions except for Models 6 and 8 
(negative binomial regression) and Model 10 (OLS). 
b Scientists involved in late-stage commercial activities are excluded. 
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4.2. Transition of other academic activities at the individual level 
Among various factors which can be affected by the entrepreneurial regime, we specifically 
focused on the sharing of research tools, or material transfer, because it is a particularly unique and 
important form of cooperation in natural science (National Academy of Sciences, 2003). Also, since this 
form of academic cooperation involves the requests for and movement of physical substances between 
scientists, the transaction can be measured with limited ambiguity. In addition, we inquired about the 
openness or secrecy of publication. Previous studies have shown that scientists tend to exclude part of their 
research results from publications and delay publications in order to keep scientific leads or protect 
commercial values (Blumenthal et al., 1997; Blumenthal et al., 2006). 
 
4.2.1. Description of other academic activities 
Sharing of research tools. Figure 13 describes the Japanese case of material transfer. Figure 13A 
illustrates the frequency of material transfer. Approximately 60% of the respondents had received a request 
for material transfer at least once in the past two years. On average, they had received 2.4 requests per year. 
We also asked whether they had denied or had been denied requests for material transfer. Figure 13B 
shows that about 20% of the scientists had had such an experience in the past two years. The likelihood of 
denial for the requests that our respondents had received from other scientists was 8.3%. 
Similar studies for US academia have shown that academic scientists share research tools slightly 
more frequently: e.g., 3.4 times per year in agriculture (Lei et al., 2009), 3.5 times per year in biomedicine 
(Walsh et al., 2007b), and 3.0 times per year in life science (Campbell et al., 2002). The literature has 
reported that the entrepreneurial regime has deterred this cooperation. In the US genomics field, 18% of 
requests for material transfer were denied in 2003-2004 (Walsh et al., 2007b), while the denial ratio was 
approximately 10% a decade ago (Campbell et al., 2002), suggesting that the cooperative relationship 
among the academia has been compromised. With this regard, the denial ratio in Japan was somewhat 
closer to that in the US 10 years ago than it is today. 
 
  
 27 
Figure 13 Material transfer 
(A) Frequency distribution 
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(B) Experience of denial 
Have you had at least one of your material requests denied by other scientists in the last 2 years? 
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Public sharing of research tools. In order to solve the problem of not sharing research tools, the 
use of central repositories has been recommended (Furman and Stern, 2006). If scientists place their 
research tools in a repository under the management of a third-party organization, any scientists can 
basically access the research tool. This system is also beneficial for supplier-side scientists in that they can 
outsource the work of preparing, storing, and sending tools. More importantly, repositories can disseminate 
tools in the long term so the original suppliers can obtain credits from users in the long term (Furman and 
Stern, 2006). Despite these benefits, the use of central repositories has not been very common, and most 
transactions of material transfer continue to occur between specific individual scientists. 
We examined the attitude of Japanese scientists regarding the sharing of research tools in a public 
space. To this end, we inquired whether our respondents had research tools which were provided widely 
for anyone who needed it without charge, and how they provided other scientists access to the tools. Figure 
14 shows that 22% of our respondents answered that they offered material through a publicly accessible 
channel for free. Figure 14B describes the media through which the respondents provided their materials or 
the information of their materials: (1) 8.3% made an announcement at conferences, (2) 3.1% posted some 
information about their material on their websites, (3) 2.2% registered their material information with 
special organizations, (4) 1.7% used central repositories to outsource material, and (5) 0.6% made an 
announcement in journals. Among these routes, (3) and (4) are mediated by third-party organizations, and 
thus, are the most readily accessible. Of all our respondents, only 3.4% used such a route, implying that 
public sharing is still fairly restricted and that improvement in this practice may expand the sharing of 
research tools. 
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Figure 14 Publicly shared material 
(A) Ratio of public sharing 
Do you have research tools that you provide without charge and widely for anyone who needs them 
through publicly accessible channels? 
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(B) Media of dissemination 
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Secrecy in publication. Figure 15A shows that 11% of our respondents admitted that they had 
delayed publications for commercial reasons. In addition, Figure 15B indicates that 17% of our 
respondents had intentionally excluded some information from publication.  
 
Figure 15 Adverse effect on publication 
(A) Delay of publication 
Have you delayed publication for commercial reasons in the last 2 years? 
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11%
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89%
 
(B) Exclusion of information from publication 
Have you intentionally omitted some information from publication in order to protect your scientific leads 
or commercial benefits in the last 2 years? 
 
YES
17%
NO
83%
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4.2.2. The effect of entrepreneurship 
In order to examine the effects of entrepreneurship on the academic environment, we drew on 
regression models in Table 3. Models 1 and 2 use denial for the latest request received as a dependent 
variable, which is coded one if a respondent denied the most recent request for material transfer they had 
received. The models include as a control variable the number of requests they had received in the last two 
years. Model 1 examines the effect of university interventions and shows a significantly negative 
coefficient of policy & guideline (b = -2.69, p < 0.05), suggesting that policies and guidelines related to 
entrepreneurship contributed to the maintaining of the cooperative relationship in academia. Model 2 add 
individual-level entrepreneurial activities as independent variables. The model shows a significantly 
positive coefficient of commercial material, which is coded one if the requested material was related to the 
commercial activities of the respondent (b = 2.11, p < 0.01). This agrees with the previous findings that 
commercial activities deter academic cooperation. However, the model also shows the counterintuitive 
result that collaboration with industry significantly decreases the likelihood of denial (b = -1.11, p < 0.05).  
Models 3 and 4 use publicly accessible material as a dependent variable, which is coded one if a 
scientist made an effort to provide his/her material through any publicly accessible channels listed in the 
previous section. The models do not show any significant effect of university-level interventions. Model 4 
shows that at least one patent and commercial activity are positively associated with the attitude to 
disseminate their materials broadly (b = 0.75, p < 0.01; b = 1.46, p < 0.001, respectively). This might be 
because commercially-active scientists tend to possess broadly applicable materials and share them to the 
extent which they can enjoy commercial benefits. This implies that entrepreneurial activities may not be 
necessarily inconsistent with the traditional norm for contribution to academia. 
Models 5 and 6 use delay of publication, and Models 7 and 8 use exclusion of information from 
publication as dependent variables. Models 6 and 8 indicate positive coefficients of at least one patent (b = 
1.90, p < 0.001; b = 1.26, p < 0.001, respectively) and commercial activity (b = 1.15, p < 0.001; b = 1.28, p 
< 0.001, respectively), suggesting that entrepreneurial activities at the individual level directly deter open 
publication. Models 5, 6, and 8 show positive coefficients of #years since foundation (b = 0.09, p < 0.1; b 
= 0.17, p < 0.01; b = 0.12, p < 0.05, respectively), suggesting that scientists tended to delay publication and 
withhold information from publication more often when their university has been entrepreneurially active 
for a longer term. Thus, in universities with a long history of entrepreneurship, there might have emerged a 
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climate that allows secrecy. Coupled with the results in Table 2, this result may imply that university 
interventions were not effective enough to facilitate entrepreneurial activities in the long term but were 
effective to create a secretive climate. 
Table 3  Prediction of academic environment at the individual level a 
 
Control variables
¥ Funds ‐.28 † (.17) ‐.35 † (.19) .15 * (.07) .02 (.08) .17 † (.09) ‐.08 (.11) .19 * (.07) ‐.03
Permanent contract .55 (.57) .63 (.56) .14 (.23) .09 (.24) .02 (.32) .09 (.36) .14 (.27) .09 (.31)
Private school .13 (.78) .48 (.80) .35 (.42) .26 (.47) .89 † (.51) .80 (.68) .95 * (.44) .98 † (.58)
# Publication .12 (.20) .17 (.21) .11 (.11) ‐.02 (.12) .35 ** (.12) .23 (.15) .26 * (.11) .14 (.13)
Research budget per scientist ‐173.11 * (87.23) ‐183.47 * (86.10) ‐24.51 (44.75) ‐33.74 (47.13) ‐53.57 (56.65) ‐53.56 (56.03) ‐55.05 (47.02) ‐57.36 (50.93)
# Request received ‐.21 ** (.08) ‐.22 * (.09)
IE (‐2007)
TLO/IPO/Incubator‐2007 ‐1.93 (1.43) ‐1.73 (1.72) ‐.11 (.86) ‐.52 (1.01) ‐.23 (1.25) ‐.70 (1.29) ‐.82 (.84) ‐1.28 (1.00)
# Years since foundation .09 (.07) .08 (.07) .01 (.04) .05 (.05) .09 † (.06) .17 ** (.06) .05 (.05) .12 * (.05)
Policy & guideline ‐2.69 * (1.31) ‐2.91 * (1.43) .43 (.70) .71 (.74) .13 (.99) .60 (1.12) .00 (.81) .35 (.91)
EA (2007‐2008)
Funding from industry .55 (.50) ‐.09 (.25) .66 (.41) .56 † (.31)
collaboration with industry ‐1.11 * (.53) ‐.34 (.25) .33 (.32) .19 (.27)
At least one patent ‐.14 (.52) .75 ** (.25) 1.90 *** (.42) 1.26 *** (.30)
Commercial activity 1.46 *** (.26) 1.15 *** (.33) 1.28 *** (.27)
Commercial material c 2.11 ** (.80)
χ2 test 29.90 * 41.39 ** 16.63 79.90 ***          52.17 *** 81.83 *** 52.32 *** 100.09 ***         
Log likelihood ‐97.77 ‐91.92 ‐315.10 ‐277.81          ‐203.84 ‐159.00 ‐275.43 ‐222.70         
Pseudo R2 .16 .21 .03 .13          .12 .29 .09 .24         
N 402 b 395 b 622 605          666 645 666 645         
Exclusion of information from 
publicationDelay of publicationPublicly accessible materialDenial for the latest request received
Model 5 Model 7Model 6 Model 8Model 2 Model 4Model 1 Model 3
 
 
                                                                
a Standard errors in parentheses. †: p<0.1, *:p<0.05, **:p<0.01, ***:p<0.001. Dummy variables for scientific fields are omitted from the table. Logit regressions. 
b Scientists who received no request for material transfer are excluded. 
c As a measure of commercial activity, Model 2 uses commercial material (specific to the latest request), while Models 4, 6, and 8 draw on commercial activity (any involvement in two years). 
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5. Discussion 
This study draws on the data of university-level interventions for entrepreneurship and their output 
(e.g., patents) and individual-level entrepreneurial activities and other academic activities, whereby it 
attempts to examine the relation between the interventions of universities and the behaviors of scientists. 
At the university level, this study confirms that, by 2007, most research-intensive universities have 
implemented certain types of infrastructure to facilitate entrepreneurship such as special organizations (e.g., 
TLOs) and related policies and guidelines although the level of the infrastructure still differed from 
university to university. The output of entrepreneurship (i.e., patents and technology transfer) has been 
growing in accordance with the university interventions. The regression analyses suggest that TLOs/IPOs 
contributed to the increase in patent application and technology transfer, indicating that these special 
organizations have functioned as intended. The data also indicates that there was a plateau in 2006-2007 in 
the number of patent applications and the income from technology transfer. This implies that we have 
arrived at a stage to discuss whether further interventions are necessary to boost the trend and whether any 
redirection of strategies is required. 
The data accordingly suggests that, entrepreneurial activities at the individual level (e.g., 
technology transfer, consultation for industry, start-ups, and participation in corporate management) are 
common in 2007-2008. Although many scientists are somehow engaged in certain forms of entrepreneurial 
activities, but that the extent of their involvement is limited in most cases. Only 7% of the scientists spent 
more than 10 hours per week for commercial activities and only 12% could earn income from commercial 
activities (licensing or income from their own firms). Regarding the effects of university interventions, the 
regression analyses seem to suggest that special organizations (i.e., the foundation of TLOs, IPOs, and 
incubators) founded in the earlier stage had negative effects on individual-level involvement in 
entrepreneurial activities. One interpretation for this is that university interventions in the earlier stage 
tended to be counterproductive because of excessive interference or workload for administration work, 
which scientists often complained about. Another interpretation is that scientists tended to overreact to the 
university interventions and start being involved in entrepreneurial activities but return to their original 
state as time passed. In other words, the effect of university interventions did not last over the long term. 
We also analyzed how entrepreneurship affected the cooperative relationship among academic 
scientists. The results indicate that individual-level entrepreneurial activities deterred academic 
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cooperation (material transfer) and fostered secrecy in publications. The results also suggest that old 
special organizations (e.g., TLOs) increased secrecy in publications, but that policies and guidelines related 
to entrepreneurship mitigated this malfunction of academic cooperation. 
These results may have the following implications. First, the data suggest that the early-stage 
university interventions might have been poorly or even negatively carried out. In this respect, the data 
also indicate that the university systems for entrepreneurship have been improved over time. This is 
encouraging news for university administrators. However, the results can also be interpreted in a different 
way, that the effects of interventions tend to be transitory and that scientists who had become 
entrepreneurially active may turn out to be inactive later on, instead concentrating on ordinary academic 
work. This implies that the overshooting reaction of scientists to the regime shift has reached equilibrium. 
If this is the case, it is worth considering sustainable mechanism to promote entrepreneurship. Of course, 
this argument depends on whether or not academic entrepreneurship is desirable in the first place. Second, 
the results generally suggest that when scientists become involved in entrepreneurial activities, they tend to 
become secretive and hesitate to cooperate with each other. This is highly consistent across many studies 
in the US. Thus, despite the potential positive aspects of entrepreneurship, certain countermeasures to 
address those adverse effects must be implemented. Our data indicates that certain guidelines related to 
entrepreneurship mitigated the negative effects. Drawing on these results, we might need to learn more 
about the mechanisms to suppress unfavorable outcome while facilitating intended effects. 
The results of this study need to be interpreted with caution because of the following limitations. 
First, our data structure does not completely address the time-series nature of the phenomena. Although we 
attempted to make use of time-series information from our datasets, future research should prepare a more 
complete form of panel data. Especially, it would be interesting to conduct a follow-up survey of the same 
respondents in future research. Second, datasets 2 was not originally designed for the purpose of this study, 
so the survey instruments may have room for improvement for the objective of this study. Third, 
individual-level data (dataset 2) depends on self-report survey, which can cause bias. Thus, future research 
should validate the results using more objective types of data. 
  
 36 
References 
 
Blumenthal, D., Campbell, E. G., Anderson, M. S., Causino, N., Louis, K. S. 1997. Withholding research 
results in academic life science - evidence from a national survey of faculty. Journal of the 
American Medical Association, 277: 1224-1228. 
Blumenthal, D., Campbell, E. G., Gokhale, M., Yucel, R., Clarridge, B., Hilgartner, S., Holtzman, N. A. 
2006. Data withholding in genetics and the other life sciences: Prevalences and predictors. 
Academic Medicine, 81: 137-145. 
Campbell, E. G., Weissman, J. S., Causino, N., Blumenthal, D. 2000. Data withholding in academic 
medicine: Characteristics of faculty denied access to research results and biomaterials. Research 
Policy, 29: 303-312. 
Campbell, E. G., Clarridge, B. R., Gokhale, M., Birenbaum, L., Hilgartner, S., Holtzman, N. A., 
Blumenthal, D. 2002. Data withholding in academic genetics - evidence from a national survey. 
Journal of the American Medical Association, 287: 473-480. 
Dasgupta, P., David, P. A. 1994. Toward a new economics of science. Research Policy, 23: 487-521. 
Etzkowitz, H. 1983. Entrepreneurial scientists and entrepreneurial universities in american academic 
science. Minerva, 21: 198-233. 
Etzkowitz, H. 1998. The norms of entrepreneurial science: Cognitive effects of the new university-industry 
linkages. Research Policy, 27: 823-833. 
Furman, J. L., Stern, S. 2006. Climbing atop the shoulders of giants: The impact of institutions on 
cumulative research NBER Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Kanama, D., Okuwada, K. 2007. 特許出願から見た東北大学の知的貢献分析, NISTEP調査資料, Vol. 
147. 
Kenney, M., Patton, D. 2009. Reconsidering the bayh-dole act and the current university invention 
ownership model. Research Policy, 38: 1407–1422. 
Lei, Z., Juneja, R., Wright, B. D. 2009. Patents versus patenting: Implications of intellectual property 
protection for biological research. Nature Biotechnology, 27: 36-40. 
Marshall, E. 2000. A deluge of patents creates legal hassles for research. Science, 288: 255-257. 
Murray, F., Stern, S. 2007. Do formal intellectual property rights hinder the free flow of scientific 
knowledge? An empirical test of the anti-commons hypothesis. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 63: 648-687. 
Nagaoka, S., Kondo, M., Flamm, K., Wessner, C. 2009. 21st century innovation systems for Japan and 
the United States: Lessons from a decade of change: Report of a symposium. Washington, D.C.: 
The National Academies Press. 
National Academy of Sciences. 2003. Sharing publication-related data and materials: Responsibilities of 
authorship in the life sciences. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. 
 37 
 38 
Nelson, R. R. 2004. The market economy, and the scientific commons. Research Policy, 33: 455-471. 
NISTEP. 2006. 大学等における科学技術・学術活動実態調査報告, NISTEP調査資料, Vol. 130. 
NISTEP. 2008. 国立大学法人の特許出願に対する知財関連施策および法人化の影響: ３大学（筑波
大学・広島大学・東北大学）の総合分析, NISTEP Research Material, Vol. 154. 
NISTEP. 2009. 第 3期科学技術基本計画のフォローアップに係る調査研究: 「イノベーションシス
テムに関する調査」プロジェクト 第 1 部 産学官連携と知的財産の創出・活用, NISTEP 
Report, Vol. 127. 
NISTEP. 2010. 科学技術の状況に係る総合的意識調査（定点調査 2009）, NISTEP Report, Vol. 136. 
Slaughter, S., Leslie, L. L. 1997. Academic capitalism: Politics, policies and the entrepreneurial 
university. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Vogeli, C., Yucel, R., Bendavid, E., Jones, L. M., Anderson, M. S., Louis, K. S., Campbell, E. G. 2006. 
Data withholding and the next generation of scientists: Results of a national survey. Academic 
Medicine, 81: 128-136. 
Walsh, J. P., Cohen, W. M., Cho, C. 2007a. Where excludability matters: Material versus intellectual 
property in academic biomedical research. Research Policy, 36: 1184-1203. 
Walsh, J. P., Jiang, M., Cohen, W. M. 2007b. Publication in the entrepreneurial university, American 
Sociological Association Annual Meeting. New York. 
Walsh, J. P., Baba, Y., Goto, A., Yasaki, Y. 2008. Promoting university-industry linkage in Japan: Faculty 
responses to a changing policy environment. Prometheus, 26: 39-54. 
Appendix.1 List of universities in dataset 2 
U Tokyo, U Kyoto, U Tohoku, U Osaka, U Hokkaido, U Kyushu, U Nagoya, U Okayama, U Chiba, U 
Kanazawa, U Kobe, U Hiroshima, U Tsukuba, U Nagasaki, U Tokushima, U Kumamoto, U Niigata, U 
Sinshu, U Gifu, Tokyo Inst Tech, Keio U, U Kogoshima, U Yamaguchi, U Tottori, Yokohama City U, 
Nihon U, Kitazato U, U Toyama, U Gunma, U Yamagata, Osaka City U, Tokyo Med & Dent U, Tokai U, 
Nagoya City U, Juntendo U, U Hirosaki, U Ehime, U Kinki, U Mie, Nihon Med U, U Kurume, Jichi Med 
U, Teikyo U, U Miyazaki, U Shimane (ordered by the amount of Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research in 
the related fields) 
  
 39 
 40 
Acknowledgments 
Send correspondence to Sotaro Shibayama (shibayama@00.alumni.u-tokyo.ac.jp). A part of the data for this study was 
obtained by a survey conducted by the research group led by Prof. Yasunori Baba at the University of Tokyo. We appreciate 
Mr. Terutaka Kuwahara, Mr. Shinichiro Maki, Mr. Hiroyuki Tomizawa, and Ms. Miyako Ogura for their critical review on 
this paper. We acknowledge Prof. John P. Walsh for his generous cooperation to this project. We are grateful to Prof. 
Hideaki Takeda at the National Institute of Informatics and Mr. Motoki Sekine at the Japan Science and Technology Agency 
for providing databases of Japanese scientists. We sincerely appreciate all the interviewees and respondents of our survey. 
We thank Ms. Asako Chiba for technical support. This study is partly supported by Postdoctoral Fellowships for Research 
Abroad of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Authors List 
 
Sotaro SHIBAYAMA 
International Affiliated Fellow, Research Unit for Science and Technology Analysis and 
Indicators, National Institute of Science and Technology Policy 
 
Georgia Institute of Technology, School of Public Policy 
 
Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, the University of Tokyo 
 
 
 
Ayaka SAKA 
Senior Research Fellow, Research Unit for Science and Technology Analysis and Indicators, 
National Institute of Science and Technology Policy 
 
